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ABSTRACT
Federal agencies regulate many products and activities that impact the safety of
children. Agencies should put a premium on saving the lives of children when
analyzing the costs and benefits of proposed regulations. This note uses original
evidence from the infant car seat market to determine that a child-specific benefit
measure should be one and a half to two times that of an adult. A child premium will
encourage more regulations that protect the safety of our society’s most precious and
innocent members.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

n 1996, Anton Skeen was riding in a sport utility vehicle with his
mother when the vehicle was involved in a rollover accident.1 Fouryear-old Anton, who was wearing a lap-and-shoulder seatbelt, slipped
out of his seatbelt, was ejected from the vehicle, and died.2 In 2002,
Congress passed “Anton’s Law,” requiring the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) to develop rules for child
restraint systems that could prevent children from being ejected from
vehicles.3 In 2003, NHTSA promulgated a rule based on Anton’s Law,
regulating child restraint systems for children up to sixty-five pounds.4
The NHTSA rule saves an estimated thirty-four children per year by
keeping children like Anton secured in booster seats during collisions.5
In 2011, NHTSA proposed a rule that regulates restraint systems for
children up to eighty pounds that could save many more children each
year.6
This note argues that agencies can better reflect society’s desire to
protect the innocent by passing more rules to save children. Some rules
would be targeted at child safety in everyday activities, like Anton
riding in a vehicle with his mother. Other rules would be targeted at
child safety in rare events, like terrorist attacks and mass shootings. A
tragic shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut,
1

2
3

4

5

6

Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Anton’s Law Mandates
Additional Child Passenger Safety Actions (Nov. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/childps/boosterseatprogress/pages
/NHTSALed.htm.
Id.
Anton’s Law, Pub. L. No. 107-318, 116 Stat. 2772 (2002) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 30127 (2002) (ordering NHTSA to regulate child restraint systems)).
See Child Restraint Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (2003) (setting standards for
booster seats for children up to sixty-five pounds).
See OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS, NHTSA, FMVSS No. 213, 225, FINAL
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS, CHILD RESTRAINT
ANCHORAGE SYSTEMS (1999) [hereinafter NHTSA], available at http://www
.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/UCRA-OMB-J08/Econ/RegEval.213.225.html.
Child Restraint Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 55825 (proposed Sept. 9, 2011) (requiring
booster seat manufacturers to ensure that their products are safe for use by
children up to eighty pounds); see also Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Child Restraint Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 51720, 51729 (2005) (initiating
rulemaking to establish regulations on restraint systems for children up to 80
pounds).
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on December 14, 2012, killed twenty first-grade students.7 At a prayer
vigil following the event, President Obama said, “This is our first task,
caring for our children. It’s our first job. If we don’t get that right, we
don’t get anything right. That’s how, as a society, we will be judged.”8
I argue that a first step to better caring for our children is to ensure that
agencies are placing the proper focus on child safety.
This argument is not based on the idea that more regulation is
always desirable, but instead that agencies should shift more focus to
regulations that promote child safety. Child-safety regulations can be
promoted through the existing regulatory framework in which
economic analysis plays a central role.9 Specifically, a benefit measure
that puts a premium on children’s safety can prompt agencies to shift
more focus to child-safety regulations. The desire for a child premium
and how to use the benefit measure in economic analysis have been
expressed in executive orders and agency guidance, but there is a gap
in the literature as to what the benefit measure should be. This note
surveys the landscape of economic analysis in rulemaking before
turning to the difficult questions of what the child premium should be
and how to justify it. In short, evidence of parent willingness to pay a
premium for the safety of children supports a benefit measure for
children that is larger than benefit measures that are derived from adult
choices about their own safety.
Executive Order 12,866, issued by President Clinton in 1993 and
substantially retained by every President since, requires agencies to
weigh the expected benefits of proposed regulations against the
expected costs.10 Quantifying costs and benefits of regulations can be
7

8

9
10

Joseph Berger, Facing the Unendurable, Families Lay to Rest Two Children,
Both 6, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19
/nyregion/more-funerals-held-in-newtown-after-massacre.html.
President Obama’s Speech at Prayer Vigil for Newtown Shooting Victims (Full
Transcript), WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com
/2012-12-16/politics/35864241_1_prayer-vigil-first-responders-newtown.
See infra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
See Exec. Order No. 12, 866, sec. 1, 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“Federal
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives . . . ”). The requirement applies to any “significant regulatory
action,” which the order defines as regulations that are expected to have an
“annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.” Id. sec. 3(f)(1). This
definition includes each of the regulations used as examples in this note.
Executive Order 12,866 was largely based on Executive Order 12291, signed by
President Reagan in 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 13193.
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difficult, and the methods selected can have large impacts on whether
proposed rules are estimated to have positive net benefits.11 The White
House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) reviews proposed
regulations and can reject promulgation of a regulation for many
reasons, including disapproval of an agency’s benefit-cost analysis
methodology or dissatisfaction with the result of the analysis.12 The
NHTSA is unlikely to move forward with the proposed rule on child
restraint systems if the regulation is not expected to produce a net
benefit based on a sound benefit-cost analysis.13 With OMB acting as a
gatekeeper to rule promulgation based largely on economic analysis,
the regulation of child restraint systems will be determined largely by
how NHTSA measures benefits and costs.14 If OMB rejects NHTSA’s
implementation of Anton’s Law because the net benefit estimate of the
regulation is “too low,” children will continue to be ejected from
vehicles and killed. Although calculation of child safety benefits may
seem an esoteric and morbid topic, children’s lives depend on the cost
and benefit estimates that are used in economic analyses.
In 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,045
requiring every federal executive agency “ensure that its policies,
programs, activities, and standards address disproportionate risks to
children that result from environmental health risks or safety risks.”15
As part of the OMB review process, agencies must separate safety
risks to children from the risks to the general population.16 Executive
Order 13,045 reflects society’s feeling that children are special, but
stops short of requiring agencies to use a separate benefit measure for
11

12

13
14

15
16

See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 3 (2003) (“Different regulations may call for different
emphases in the analysis, depending on the nature and complexity of the
regulatory issues and the sensitivity of the benefit and cost estimates to the key
assumptions.”).
See generally Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of
Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis 8 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 111 (1994) (discussing benefit-cost analysis of regulations).
See id. at 114.
See id. at 112–13 (discussing health-health analysis as an alternative way to
approach costs and benefits in regulatory review); see also FAQ, OFFICE OF
INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited
Feb. 25, 2013).
Exec. Order No. 13,045, sec. 1-101(b), 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 21, 1997).
Id. at sec. 1-101(a).
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improved safety of children.17 President Clinton stopped short of
mandating child-specific benefit measures because of a lack of studies
on what the child-specific measures should be.18
In the wake of Executive Order 13,045, scientists and economists
have turned increased attention to how safety regulations impact
children and how society values the safety improvements.19 The
Children’s Health Valuation Handbook, published by the
Environmental Protection Agency in 2003, provides guidance to
agencies such as the NHTSA engaged in benefit-cost analysis of
proposed regulations that impact child safety.20 Society appears to
value child safety differently from adult safety, so the Handbook
recommends that agencies use child-specific benefit measures.21
Instead, agencies currently use benefit measures for adults to estimate
the value of improved safety to everyone, including children.22
Agencies cite a lack of studies measuring the benefits of improved
child safety as the main reason they do not use child-specific benefit
measures.23 This note helps to fill that gap.
The federal government regulates many activities and products that
impact the safety of children. For example, the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) sets standards for baby food to ensure that
infants receive the nutrients they need with products that meet exacting
quality controls.24 The Consumer Product Safety Commission
regulates products such as toys, cribs, and strollers to ensure that they
do not pose undue risks to children.25 There are also regulations that
impact broader populations, but have concentrated effects on young
people. For example, the EPA regulates lead due to its toxicity and has
17

18

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

See id. at sec. 1-101 (“Children’s behavior patterns may make them more
susceptible to accidents because they are less able to protect themselves.”).
See id. at sec. 3-301 (creating a task force to develop research on child-specific
risks).
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (“EPA”), CHILDREN’S HEALTH VALUATION
HANDBOOK 1-1 (2003) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (surveying scientific and
economic studies of child health valuation).
Id.
Id. at 2–6.
Id. at 2–5.
Id.
See 21 U.S.C. § 350a(1) (2006) (authorizing the FDA to inspect infant formula).
See 15 U.S.C. § 2056a (2008) (authorizing the Consumer Products Safety
Commission to regulate consumer products including toys and cribs).
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banned lead paint from being used in situations where children would
be exposed because children are especially sensitive to lead toxicity.26
These are just a few examples of the many federal regulations that are
designed to increase safety levels for children.27
The social desire to protect children, as expressed in Executive
Order 13,045 and the best practices outlined in the Handbook suggest
a premium on child safety as compared to adults, which conflicts with
the current agency practice of using an adult benefit measure for
children.28 This note argues that agencies should indeed put a premium
on saving the lives of children when analyzing the benefits and costs
of regulations. A premium on children’s lives will make regulations
that focus on child safety, such as NHTSA’s implementation of
Anton’s Law, more likely to pass a benefit-cost analysis and become
law. This note is the first to combine market evidence of what people
are willing to pay for child safety with a practical method for agencies
to implement a child-specific benefit measure. By following the
roadmap in this note, agencies can quickly implement safety
regulations that better comport with the law and, most importantly,
prevent innocent children from dying.
The note proceeds with Section II providing background on federal
regulations and a review of why and how benefits and costs of
regulations are measured. Section III sets out theoretical justifications
for a child premium on benefits; children have long life expectancies
with expected increases in their standards of living and are not at fault
for the risks they face because they are not in a position to make
informed life-and-death decisions. Section IV considers market-based
evidence that parents are willing to pay more for child safety than
adult safety as a justification for the child premium. Original empirical
evidence from the infant car seat market, supported by existing
evidence from the baby food market, provides agencies with a
rationale for valuing the life of a child at one and a half to two times
that of an adult. Section V provides agencies with a roadmap for
implementing the child premium with a multiplier on the lives of
children expected to be saved by regulations. Section VI concludes
26

27

28

See 40 C.F.R. § 745(L) (2006E) (2008) (EPA rule banning lead in most
residential homes under authority of Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act,
which added Title IV to Toxic Substances Control Act).
See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text; see also 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (2004)
(setting national standards for low-level ozone).
See HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-1 to 1-2.
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that more child safety is normatively desirable and discusses
alternative methods of achieving this increased safety level.
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CHILD SAFETY REGULATIONS
This section surveys federal safety regulations, paying special
attention to rules that impact child safety. Examples of safety
regulations show the broad scope of regulation in the United States
and introduces the products that will be used as the basis for market
evidence discussed in Section IV. Since regulatory analysis often
involves the use of economic tools, the note briefly discusses market
justifications for the existence of regulation in the first place. This
includes discussions of the costs and benefits of increased safety as
well as rationale and application of benefit-cost analysis to regulations.
This discussion of the economic analysis of regulations sets the stage
for why a child premium is needed and justified.
A. Regulations that Impact Safety
Many statutes and regulations are intended to improve safety.29 For
example, NHTSA sets a wide array of standards for seatbelts, airbags,
and structural panels of vehicles to ensure that these features meet
minimum safety levels and consumers can trust that new vehicles will
be reasonably safe.30 NHTSA regulations play an important role in
ensuring that vehicles are safe, but stringent regulations also lead to
higher vehicle prices.31 The tradeoff between price and safety in
vehicle travel will be further explored in Section IV.
Other agencies also act to improve safety.32 For example, the FDA
regulates pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and food to promote our

29

30

31

32

See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655–677 (2006)
(authorizing the creation of the Occupational Safety & Health Agency to create
rules to improve safety in the workplace); Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–
965 (2006) (mandating mine safety).
See Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (2006) (authorizing the
Secretary of Transportation to create safety standards for motor vehicles).
See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets Higher Fuel Efficiency Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2102, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/business/energyenvironment/obama-unveils-tighter-fuel-efficiency-standards.html (quoting the
Secretary of Transportation as estimating that more stringent fuel economy
standards would lead to price increases of $2000 to $3000 per vehicle).
See infra notes 38 and 39.
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health and wellness.33 The FDA approves pharmaceuticals for the
market only after onerous testing procedures.34 The FDA also
regulates most food to ensure that it will meet certain quality criteria.35
Federal regulation of food can help solve an asymmetric information
problem.36 Unsafe food is often hard to distinguish from healthy food
before it is eaten, and since consumers eat a wide array of foods, it
would be difficult to distinguish which food caused illness after it has
been eaten.37 Evidence of consumer willingness to pay for safety in the
food market will be examined in Section IV.
Consider also the EPA regulation of air under the Clean Air Act,
water under the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, or
toxic substances under a number of other acts.38 The goals of these
acts include promotion of human health and environmental quality.39
Regulators traditionally focus on the human health benefits of
regulation, so they are most concerned with environmental issues that
impact human health and welfare.40 Environmental regulations are
usually motivated by the classic market failures associated with public
goods, and often impact large populations.41 The broad scope of the
33

34

35

36

37
38

39
40
41

See 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006) (authorizing the FDA to regulate pharmaceuticals
and food).
See id. § 355(b)(1)(A) (requiring proponents of new drugs to submit
investigations of a drug’s safety and effectiveness as part of its application for
introduction to the public).
Id. § 393(2)(A); see also Mission Statement, THE U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE
(“USDA”),
http
://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=MISSION_STATEMENT.h
tm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (also regulates food for similar reasons.); 21
U.S.C. § 602 (2006) (authorizing the USDA to regulate meat products because it
is “essential in the public interest that the health and welfare of consumers be
protected.”).
See David A. Hennessy, Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry
Vertical Integration, 78 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 1034, 1035 (1996) (explaining
that asymmetric information refers to situations in which one party knows more
than the other parties involved).
Id. at 1036.
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1–7) (2006); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)
(2006).
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 114 (6th ed. 2009).
Public goods are things that are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that it is
difficult to prevent others from using the good and one person’s use of the thing

2013

Protecting the Innocent

273

environmental issues regulated by the EPA shows that the health and
safety of every person living in the United States is impacted by
regulations.42
Some regulations focus on the safety of children in particular.43
NHTSA recommends that children under twenty-two pounds sit in
rear-facing car seats, and children under sixty-five pounds use restraint
systems, which are most commonly car seats or booster seats.44
Parents who fail to follow these rules are subject to state traffic laws,
with fines ranging from $10 to $500.45 For new car seats to be sold in
the United States, they must be approved by NHTSA.46 NHTSA
requires a new infant car seat to have a five-point harness, use the
Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (“LATCH”) anchor system,
and pass a series of crash tests.47 The five-point harness attaches to the
seat at five places and is more effective than a traditional three-point

42

43

44

45

46
47

does not prevent another person from using it. See id. at 162. Public goods are
classically associated with a market failure of under-provision, since producers
have a difficult time charging people for their use. Id. In extreme cases, such as
the air around us, there is a total lack of a market. See id.
See Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.epa.gov
/aboutepa/whatwedo.html (describing the EPA’s purpose as, among other
things, to “ensure that all Americans are protected from significant risks to
human health and the environment where they live, learn and work,” and to
accomplish that mission they “develop and enforce regulations.”).
See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2057c(d)(3)(B)
(2006) (authorizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to set regulations
banning lead in children’s toys).
MELISSA A. SAVAGE ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
PROTECTING CHILDREN: A GUIDE TO CHILD TRAFFIC SAFETY LAWS 6 (2002).
See Child Passenger Safety Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOC., (Oct.
2012), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/childsafety_laws.html (setting
out state fines for child safety violations). The lowest fine for not having your
child in an appropriate restraint system is $10 in Michigan. Id. Nevada has the
highest at $500. Id.
Child Restraint Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.213.S5(a)–(c) (2003).
See Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (LATCH) Restraint System,
NHTSA, (2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/safety/latch; Nat’l Highway Trans. Safety
Occupant Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 at S4.1.2.2 (2003) (requiring
five-point harness); Child Restraint Anchorage Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.225
(requiring most new vehicles to have the LATCH system and specifying crash
test parameters).
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seatbelt at keeping the child in the seat.48 The LATCH system uses
straps and buckles to make the seat itself less likely to move than if it
were strapped down with a traditional seatbelt.49 Front and rear crash
tests ensure that the seat can retain and protect a child in low and mid
speed crashes.50 More recently, Congress has charged NHTSA with
the task of “minimizing head injuries from side impact collisions,”
which NHTSA is currently studying.51 In the interim period while
NHTSA is studying the issue, some car seat producers have already
started offering side impact protection in car seats. Consumer
willingness to pay for side impact protection will be the source of this
note’s original market evidence that parents are willing to pay a
premium for the safety of children.
Another regulation impacting child safety is the FDA’s regulation
of baby food to ensure that parents can be confident that the foods on
the store shelves will be reasonably safe for their children.52 The FDA
requires baby food processors to test their products and facilities for a
range of pathogens and toxic substances.53 When there is reason to
suspect a tainted product, the FDA has authority to require the
producer to recall the product.54 These safety measures increase the
costs of producing baby food.55 Much of this increased cost is passed
on to consumers, especially since demand for a product like baby food
48

49

50
51

52

53
54
55

See 49 C.F.R. § 571.225 at S1 (2003) (describing the purpose of the LATCH
requirement as “to increase the likelihood that child restraints are properly
secured and thus more fully achieve their potential effectiveness”).
See Nat’l Highway Trans. Safety Administration, Lower Anchors and Tethers
for Children (LATCH) Restraint System (2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/Safety
/LATCH.
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 at S2 (2003).
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act,
sec. 14, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1806 (2000) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 30127).
See 21 U.S.C. § 350a (2006) (outlining requirements for nutrient content, quality
control, and recall of infant formula).
Id. at § 350a(b)(2).
Id. at § 350a(e)(1)(B).
See FDA, SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR INFANT FORMULA RECALL
REGULATIONS 6 (estimating manufacturer cost per recall of $758,240 for
information sharing requirements).This is only a small piece of the expected cost
of recalls, which is only one of the expected costs that are prompted by FDA
regulations. Id.
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is relatively insensitive to changes in price.56 This note surveys
existing research measuring willingness to pay a premium for safer
baby food to support the empirical results from the child car seat data.
Many EPA regulations significantly impact child safety. Young
children are especially susceptible to many kinds of pollutant
exposure. For example, exposure to heavy metals like mercury and
lead is especially toxic to fetuses and young children.57 The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) have a target blood level
of lead of ten micro-grams per liter (µg/L) or less for children because
this concentration appears to be a threshold above which adverse
health effects appear.58 The threshold for adults, who are more resilient
to lead exposure, is twenty-five µg/L.59
Because of children’s increased sensitivity to lead, the EPA bases
its lead standards largely on how children will be impacted.60 In 1973,
the EPA promulgated a finding that lead was dangerous to human
health and safety after studies showed that lead impaired cognitive
development in children.61 This finding was followed by a rule that
phased out the use of lead as an additive in gasoline.62 Based on more
scientific evidence of lead’s toxicity, the EPA classified lead as a
criteria air pollutant under the Clean Air Act, which led to regulation
of other sources of airborne lead.63 Children are also exposed to lead
56

57

58

59

60
61

62
63

When consumers are relatively insensitive to changes in price, economists call
demand for the product inelastic; when producers face an inelastic demand, they
are able to pass along the majority of cost increases in the form of higher prices
without seeing a large corresponding drop in the quantity purchased. W. KIP
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 210–12 (4th ed.
2005).
See 40 C.F.R. § 141.86 (2010) (setting out requirements for water systems to
lower lead and copper levels in drinking water to prevent harm to children).
Lead, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (“CDC”), (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www
.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/.
CDC, Adult Blood Lead Epidemiology and Surveillance-United States 2008–
2009, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, vol. 60 no. 25 at 841
(2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6025a2
.htm.
See Exec. Order No. 13,045, sec. 1-101, 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 21, 1997).
See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1(a) (2002) (limiting the amount of lead allowed in gasoline
because of health concerns).
Id. at § 80.22(b).
42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006).
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through drinking water.64 In 1986, the EPA started regulating lead
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.65 The EPA’s regulation of lead
demonstrates how safety regulations that are largely driven by concern
for children can have far-reaching impacts on broader populations.
The above discussion of safety regulations gives a picture of the
broad scope of regulations that aim to correct market failures and
protect the population of the United States. By focusing on a few of
these regulations that are targeted towards children, this note suggests
that people care deeply about the safety of children and are willing to
pay a premium for it. This finding has implications for a broad range
of regulations that impact everyone in the United States. In order to set
the stage for why and how to better promote child safety, this note
turns next to a discussion of the role of economic analysis in agency
rulemaking.
B. Costs and Benefits of Safety Regulations
When an agency is setting a safety regulation, it has the difficult
decision of determining the appropriate level of safety. Determining
the appropriate level of safety can be difficult because there are
tradeoffs to safety in the form of higher product prices, less consumer
choice, and increased burdens on industry.66 For example, should
NHTSA require car seats to be made of a safe, but expensive,
polymer? If car seats made of this polymer would cost several hundred
dollars and would be unaffordable for many families, the answer may
be no. The agency has to determine the appropriate balance between
safety and the costs of that safety.67 Economic theory suggests that a
regulation that is a response to a market failure, such as information
asymmetry or lack of a market, is more likely to pass a balancing of
costs and benefits.68
Occasionally, Congress has mandated a particular safety level that
regulators must strive to reach.69 Consider, for example, the Delaney
64

65
66
67
68
69

S. Triantafyllidou et al., Lead Exposure Through Drinking Water: Lessons to be
Learned from Recent U.S. Experience, 11 GLOBAL NEST J. 341 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 300g-6 (2012).
HANDBOOK, supra note 19 at 22.
Id.
Id. at 4.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651,
1663–67 (2001) (surveying statutes with mandated safety levels).
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Clause, which says that zero artificial carcinogens should be allowed
as additives in food products.70 In this case, the FDA must either
follow the statutory mandate, leading to over-regulation, or follow a
more sensible course fraught with political risk.71 If the FDA chooses
to allow a non-zero amount of artificial carcinogens as food additives,
it could face judicial challenges or budget cuts.72 Most statutory
mandates, however, leave a good deal of discretion to agencies to
determine the “reasonable” or “justifiable” level of safety.73
When so directed by Congress, how can an agency determine what
is a reasonable or justifiable level of safety? And if there are multiple
safety levels that are reasonable, which level should the agency
choose? Executive Order 12,866 instructs agencies to use economic
analysis to review major federal regulations.74 Major regulations are
defined as those that have an expected impact of more than $100
million per year.75 Agencies must submit proposed regulations to the
OMB, which has authority to reject proposed rules or require
amendment or additional analysis by the agency; because of OMB
review, economic analysis often plays a central role in determining a
regulation’s reasonableness.76
In 2003, the OMB issued Circular A-4, containing guidance on
how the economic analysis should be performed.77 Circular A-4 lays
out the preferred form of economic analysis called the benefit-cost
analysis, which compares the expected benefits of the regulation with
70
71
72
73

74
75
76

77

Id. at 1663–64 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1994)).
Id.
Id. at 1655 n.17.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (instructing EPA to limit use of substances
when there is a “reasonable risk”); 42 U.S.C. § 2167(d)(1)–(3) (2006)
(justifiable risk).
Exec. Order No. 12, 866, sec. 1(a), 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
Id. sec. 3(f)(1).
Id. sec. 2(b). The OMB has authority to reject rules proposed by executive
agencies like those mentioned in this note. Independent agencies such as the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) are not subject to binding review by the OMB, although they
are required to report their regulatory activities. See id. Although this note
discusses review by the OMB, economic analysis is handled by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, a division of the OMB. Id.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003).
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the expected costs.78 Agencies are supposed to look at a range of
alternatives to see which alternative provides the largest net benefit.79
For safety regulations, this can be instructive in determining how
stringently to regulate potential risks of bodily harm.80 If the regulation
has a positive net benefit, the agency has an argument that the safety
level is reasonable.81 The safety level of the alternative that leads to
the highest net benefit might be considered the best alternative,
although agencies can, and often do, deviate from this alternative for
reasons such as politics, uncertainty, and institutional constraints.82
Costs in a benefit-cost analysis are usually calculated by adding the
predicted burden on industry and regulatory costs.83 Although these
numbers are not always easy to estimate, agency analysts and outside
consultants usually work with the affected industry to figure out how
production and sales will be impacted, then work with the agency to
predict costs of implementation and enforcement.84 To come up with
these numbers, information from the market can often be used directly,
such as the difference in prices between goods that have and lack the
safety feature, or indirectly, such as agency official wages multiplied
by the expected hours spent on the rule.85
C. Measuring Benefits of Regulations that Impact Safety
The benefits of safety regulations are often more difficult to
measure and quantify than the costs of regulations.86 It is hard to
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

86

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 21–22. For a critique of this methodology and suggestions for
improvement, see William A. Pizer & Raymond Kopp, Calculating the Costs of
Environmental Regulation (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 03-06,
(2003). Pizer and Kopp explain the standard agency process for calculating costs
as a collaborative effort with industry and the agency. Id. They argue that this
process gives industry incentives to provide exaggerated estimates and makes
the agency decision prone to undue influence from industry. Id. They
recommend improving the process by having more independent research done
by outside consultants. Id.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 18 (2003).
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quantify the value of things like health and clean air that are not traded
in markets.87 The methods outlined below use art and science to try to
measure how much people value particular aspects of safety compared
with other goods and services. Scholars and professionals use market
evidence and surveys to estimate the benefits of safety regulations.
This note turns to these methodologies in Section IV to estimate a
child premium.
A widespread methodology starts by quantifying the change in
health outcomes due to the safety regulation.88 For example, regulation
of lead in drinking water was expected to prevent 30,000 children
annually from exceeding the maximum recommended level of lead in
their blood.89 The decrease in exposure was predicted to prevent
cognitive development problems that would have decreased
intelligence and later required remedial education.90 This type of
estimate is usually the result of a series of studies that look at the doseresponse relationship between the regulated substance and various
exposed populations.91
After a change in health outcomes has been quantified, the agency
must convert this benefit to dollars if it wants to compare the benefits
of the regulation to the costs.92 This step is especially difficult and
controversial as people tend to be averse to the idea of putting a
monetary value on things that are seen as intensely personal and even
sacred.93 How much is it worth to avoid a case of chronic bronchitis or
a premature death from respiratory failure? When dealing with
regulatory policy, which inevitably impacts a large population, it is
important to remember that the monetization of a prevented case of
bronchitis or premature fatality is not for a specific person, but rather a
87
88

89
90
91

92

93

Id.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 40, at 202 (describing benefit-cost analysis of
lead regulation).
Id.
Id. at 204.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT: DOSERESPONSE ASSESSMENT (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/risk
_assessment/dose-response.htm.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003).
See VIVIANA ZELIZER. PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN 148 (2001) (arguing that putting an implicit price on the
life of a child is immoral).
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small change in probability for everyone in the impacted population.94
A life of an actual person may well be considered priceless,95 but small
changes in the probability of fatality are part of everyday life
whenever someone makes a decision of whether to get into a car, take
medication, or eat a hamburger.96 Monetizing these changes in
probabilities is not the same as putting a dollar value on the life of a
particular human.97
OMB Circular A-4 requires agencies to make the difficult
quantification of how much people value a change in health or safety
whenever possible.98 The preferred method for quantifying the dollar
impact of changes in health outcomes is to use market-based estimates
of people’s willingness to pay (“WTP”) to avoid the negative health
outcome.99 The Handbook explains that WTP is the theoretically
preferred starting point for measuring benefits because “individuals are
best suited to judge for themselves the value of goods or services.”100
For example, if a consumer is willing to spend an extra four dollars to
avoid a one in one hundred chance of contracting the flu, the implicit
value of averting a case of the flu is $400. When averaged across a
sample of the population, these WTP values for risk reduction are
indicative of the safety versus cost tradeoff that matches the
population’s preferences.101 As long as those WTP values are based on
informed decision-making, a responsive government agency should
choose regulations that match those preferences.102
If there is no market evidence available for estimating WTP,
agencies can use evidence from stated-preference studies.103 Statedpreference studies use surveys to ask people hypothetical questions

94

95
96
97
98

99
100
101
102
103

W.KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 84 (1992).
ZELIZER, supra note 93, at 147.
VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 19.
Id. at 20.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 29 (2003).
Id.
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-6.
Id.
Id. at 2-6 to 2-7.
Id. at 2-7. Stated-preference studies are also called contingent valuation studies.
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about their preferences.104 For example, after receiving information
about the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker, I may be asked how
much I am willing to pay to help protect ten nesting pairs of these
woodpeckers.105 Stated preferences are generally considered less
reliable than market data because respondents do not have clear, strong
incentives to give truthful responses about how they feel.106 If I believe
this survey is going to be used to set policy and I prefer more
conservation, I may act strategically and say that I would pay
$1,000,000 to protect the woodpeckers. Since I do not really pay the
amount of my response and “put my money where my mouth is,” there
is not the same check on responses as there is in market situations
where people are actually paying to enact their preferences.107
The bulk of studies looking at monetization of health benefits
focus on the value of preventing fatalities, called the value of a
statistical life (“VSL”).108 VSL is usually based on how much people
are willing to pay for a small change in the probability of death.109 If
everyone in a city of one million people were willing to pay $10 to
prevent an unknown one of those million people from dying, that
would lead to a VSL estimate of $10 million.110 The majority of VSL
studies use data from the labor market to see how much workers must
be paid to take a job that has a risk of fatality.111 Labor economists call
extra pay to tolerate an undesirable attribute of a job a compensating
104
105

106
107
108

109
110

111

Id. at 4-6.
See REPORT OF THE NOAA PANEL ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (May 9, 2001)
available at 58 Fed. Reg. 4601, 4603–04 (recommending best practices for
stated-preference studies). This example uses an open-ended question about
WTP. Most stated-preference studies actually have a closed-ended format,
which is found to be more reliable.
Id. at 4605.
Id. at 4610.
VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 19. Agencies are also interested in the non-fatal
health and safety effects of regulation. For a variety of reasons, it tends to be
much more difficult to get reliable evidence for WTP for non-fatal outcomes.
See Richard Zeckhauser, Measuring Risks and Benefits of Food Safety
Decisions, 38 VAND. L. REV. 539, 545 (1985) (describing tradeoffs of health
risks and the difficulties in quantifying these tradeoffs).
VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 19.
To calculate this value, take the average willingness-to-pay of $10, multiplied
by the change in risk of one per million = $10 million.
W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction
and Overview, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 7 (2010).
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differential.112 These labor market studies tend to show that workers
demand compensating differentials that lead to VSL estimates around
$7 million.113 For example, for a worker to be indifferent between a
completely safe job and a similar job with an annual fatality risk of
one in ten-thousand he would require an additional $0.35 per hour to
work the risky job.114 Professors Aldy and Viscusi show that VSL
estimates from labor market studies result in an inverted U-shape when
VSL is plotted over a range of worker ages, meaning that VSL
estimates start low for young workers, increase to a maximum around
forty-five years old, then decrease slowly for older workers.115 The
VSL has increased with time as income has risen, with an estimate of
$4.6 million in 1984, and a current estimate of $7.4 million.116
Although most studies are based on information from the labor
market, there are also VSL estimates that result from consumer
product markets for things like medicine and bicycle helmets.117 These
studies look at how much consumers are willing to pay for safety
features in products. A benefit of consumer product studies is that they
can provide VSL estimates for populations that are not in the labor
market.118 Another alternative is to use stated-preference surveys to
112
113

114

115

116

117

118

VISCUSI, supra note 94, at 34.
W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
5, 18 (2003).
See id. at 19–21. To calculate this compensating differential, $7 million VSL
multiplied by .0001 (the change in probability that a fatal accident will happen)
divided by 2000 hours per year, equals $.35 per hour. This assumes that workers
know that there is a change in risk and work forty hours per week for fifty weeks
per year. These assumptions are standard in the literature. Id. at 55.
Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for
Age and Cohort Effects, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 573, 573–74 (2008).
Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA (2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf
/pages/MortalityRiskValuation.html. Other agencies have seen similar increases
in their VSL estimates over this time period. Id. These values have been
adjusted for inflation to a common unit of 2006 dollars. Id.
See Glenn C. Blomquist et al., Willingness to Pay for Improving Fatality Risks
and Asthma Symptoms: Values for Children and Adults of All Ages, 33 RES. &
ENERGY ECON. 410, 410–11 (2011) (estimating VSL from willingness to pay for
asthma medicine); Robin R. Jenkins et al., Valuing Reduced Risks to Children:
The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 19 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 397, 400 (2001)
(estimating VLS from data on bicycle helmet usage).
Id.
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compute a VSL.119 Regulators in the United Kingdom tend to use
stated preference studies to estimate VSL.120
With a measure of the value of a change in health or safety in
hand, an agency can multiply the estimated impact of the regulation on
health or safety by the value measure.121 For example, a regulation of
workplace safety that is expected to save ten workers per year would
have an expected benefit of $74 million using a VSL of $7.4
million.122 The EPA used this methodology to predict that decreasing
exposure to airborne lead yields health benefits of $236 million per
year, $193 million of which come from reducing children’s
exposure.123 Later studies found that this prediction probably
underestimated the true benefits of reducing lead exposure.124 The
EPA predicted that reducing lead in drinking water would generate
$2.8 billion in annual benefits, with $2.2 billion coming from a
decrease in damage to children’s cognitive development.125
The above examples give a sense for why it is important to
accurately estimate society’s desire to balance the tradeoff between
safety and cost. When the desire for safety is overestimated,
consumers face restricted choices and pay higher prices for marginal
increases in safety. When the desire for safety is underestimated,
unsafe products or conditions are allowed to continue despite society’s
willingness to pay for increased safety. As the next section explains,
agencies currently underestimate society’s desire for child safety
regulations. Fortunately, correcting the estimate can be done within the
existing regulatory analysis framework by implementing a child
premium when measuring benefits of safety.

119

120
121
122
123
124
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OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 22 (2003).
See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 113 at 56–57.
LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, ET AL.,THE REGULATORY STATE 484 (2010).
Ten workers saved per year multiplied by VSL of $7.4 million = $74 million.
EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE 13 (Mar. 1984).
See Joel Schwartz, Societal Benefits of Reducing Lead Exposure, 66 ENVTL.
RES. 105, 117 (1994) (describing the unexpected benefit of lower blood pressure
with reduced lead exposure).
See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS ADDENDUM: PROPOSED CHANGES TO
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS FOR LEAD AND COPPER 5
(1996) (anticipating costs and benefits of reducing lead and copper in drinking
water).
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III. A CHILD PREMIUM: THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Estimation of the benefits of improved child safety poses unique
challenges.126 Children depend on parents or guardians for support, so
they do not regularly make autonomous decisions that can be used as
market evidence of willingness to pay.127 Children are not in the labor
market, so compensating differentials cannot be used to estimate a
VSL.128 Children do not regularly make purchasing decisions on
consumer products involving safety that could provide evidence of a
WTP for safety.129 Even if children did make these decisions, there
would be doubts about what this evidence would mean.130 Children
have not fully developed their cognitive abilities, including the parts of
the brain that process risky decisions.131 Regulations aim to set safety
levels that are reasonable based on WTP, but if decision-makers are
not rational, then it is unclear what their decisions reveal.132 It may
well be that society wishes to increase the safety of children, even if
those children may not make that choice for themselves.133 For
example, a ten-year-old boy may be perfectly willing to ride on a roller
coaster of dubious safety, but his parents, and society in general,
probably wish to prevent him from doing so.
The EPA’s Children’s Health Valuation Handbook serves as a
guide for measuring benefits of regulations that impact child safety.134
The Handbook is not legally binding but is instead meant to serve as
guidance for the EPA and other federal agencies that are performing
cost-benefit analyses.135 The most common current approach is to
measure benefits of child safety using a VSL calculated from adult
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130
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HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-6.
Id. at 2-7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision
Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCH. SCI. IN
THE PUB. INTEREST 1, 29 (2006).
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-7.
Id.
Id. at 1-1.
Id. at 1-3.
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data.136 The Handbook provides advice on how adult VSL could be
adjusted for use with children.137 However, this practice is uncommon.
Essentially, agencies currently regard all lives saved by regulation as
equal.138 Although there is a simple moral appeal to this idea, there are
several reasons we may say there is something special about saving the
lives of children.139 Children and adults play very different roles in
society.140 Children engage in special activities and generally have less
responsibility than adults.141 These differences might well prompt us to
value benefits to children differently.
A. Long Life Expectancy
One of the obvious differences between children and adults is age:
children are younger than adults. From a 2012 perspective, a threeyear-old child born in 2009 would be expected to live for 75 more
years.142 A twenty-year-old adult born in 1992 has a life expectancy of
56 more years.143 A forty-year-old born in 1962 can be expected to
live another 30 years.144 The precise value of a saved life depends on
the characteristics of the life saved.145 A young person has a longer life
expectancy, so in some respects, regulations that save children offer
more bang for the buck.146 As medical technology continues to
improve, we hope and expect that life expectancy at birth will continue
to rise in the future.

136
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Id. at 3-12.
Id. at 2-13–14.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 205, 206 (2004).
Id.
Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What? Critical
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573
(2008).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (defining the child
actor’s standard of care in a negligence action to be that of a reasonable child of
like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances).
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES, (2011), available at http://www
.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as120/LifeTables_Tbl_14.html#wp1046284.
Id.
Id.
Sunstein, supra note 138, at 208.
Id.
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B. Innocence of Children
A second reason we may wish to put a premium on children’s lives
is that children are often thought of as blameless. Young children,
especially infants, have not made life choices that put themselves or
others at risk of harm. The law recognizes the doctrine of “assumption
of risk” for adults who choose to engage in activity that has high
inherent risks.147 This same doctrine does not apply to children in like
manner because children are different.148 Children have not fully
developed their decision-making abilities.149 They have fewer
experiences and less knowledge to draw on when making a
decision.150 Often they lack the authority to make the decision in the
first place.151 Although people tend to think of children as curious and
mischievous, people also think of them as innocent when it comes to
life-threatening situations. The theory is that some adults, whether
parents or tortfeasors, should have prevented the child from being
harmed.
This sense of innocence could transfer from the tort realm to the
regulatory realm. Children have not made choices to emit lead into the
air, allow dangerous bacteria into processed food, or drive recklessly.
Some adults have made these choices, and our society has come up
with mechanisms for how to regulate, deter, and punish that behavior.
Perhaps, as a society, we wish to see extra regulation, deterrence, and
punishment when children’s lives are at stake.
IV. A CHILD PREMIUM: EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The Handbook asks for empirical evidence to support the
theoretical arguments for a premium on child safety regulations.152
Empirical support can show that people in society are already making
147

148

149
150
151
152

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A(1965) (general rule); Id. at
§ 496D cmt. c. (“If by reason of age, or lack of information, experience,
intelligence, or judgment, the plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a
known situation, he will not be taken to assume the risk . . . .”).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (noting that a children’s
standard of conduct in negligence actions is different from that of adults).
Reyna & Farley, supra note 131, at 20.
Id.
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-7.
Id. at 1-1.
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choices consistent with a premium on children’s lives.153 As
mentioned above, it is difficult to get evidence for constructing a child
VSL from either the labor market or from purchases by children.154
Instead of using evidence from children’s decisions, this note follows
the recommendation of the Handbook to use evidence of their parents’
willingness to pay.155 Parent WTP seems like a reasonable proxy for
child WTP because parents are usually the ones making safety
decisions in the market for their children.156 If parents are willing to
pay more for the safety of their children than for themselves, that is
evidence that they put a premium on the lives of children. Although
there is a special relationship between parents and children that
impacts WTP for safety, that does not dilute the value of market
evidence for use in a VSL calculation.157 The Handbook describes the
theoretically preferred basis for VSL calculations as individuals’ WTP
for their own safety, and clearly there is a special relationship between
the purchaser and beneficent in that situation.158 Parent WTP, in lieu of
unavailable or undesirable child WTP, seems like the most appropriate
gauge for society’s preferences for child safety.
A. Original Evidence: Car Seats
This note contributes to the literature by collecting original data to
estimate a VSL for children. Parent WTP for additional safety in a
particular product market can give a sense of our society’s preferences
for the appropriate tradeoff between safety and cost. Agencies should
use these estimates when considering proposed rules so government
regulations will reflect what people in the United States consider to be
the appropriate level of safety.
The car seat market is one place where parents make purchases
that have implications for the safety of their children. As mentioned
above, NHTSA requires car seats to have certain safety features that
153
154
155
156
157

158

Id. at 2-7.
See supra notes 127, 128 and accompanying text.
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-9.
Id. at 2-8.
One could argue that parents’ WTP for their children’s safety is partially a
product of evolution; humans are programmed to feel and act in ways that will
increase the probability that their genes will be passed on. But see id.
(recommending WTP measures for safety of the respondent).
Id. at 2-9.
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are common to all car seats.159 Groups like Consumer Reports find that
there are still variations in the safety levels of car seats that are
available.160 For example, all car seats may protect the child in front
and rear collision tests at thirty miles per hour, but some seats may
provide protection in collisions at forty miles per hour while others
may not.
One car seat feature that has recently become popular is side
impact protection (“SIP”).161 A car seat with SIP is supposed to
provide protection for the child in the event of a side impact
collision.162 The NHTSA does not currently regulate SIP, although
Congress has ordered them to consider doing so.163 The European
Union currently requires infant car seats to pass a side impact test.164
To come up with a concrete estimate of WTP for child safety, data is
collected on SIP in car seats designed for infants less than one year
old.
1. Willingness to Pay for Side Impact Protection
Target and Toys “R”Us are two of the largest car seat retailers in
the country. A sample of the car seats available on their websites in
October 2011 resulted in 161 car seats, 68 of which provide SIP.165
Table 1 shows average prices of the car seats, with a column for the
entire sample, a column for seats with SIP, and a column for seats
without SIP. Car seats with SIP have an average price of $181.92,
while car seats without SIP have an average price of $129.20.
159
160

161

162
163
164

165

NHTSA, supra note 5, at 2.
See Report on Infant Car Seat Safety, CONSUMER REPORTS (2011) (summary of
main report), available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/babies-kids
/baby-toddler/travel-gear/car-seats/car-seats/what-we-found-in-our-recent-tests
/index.htm.
See What Does Car Seat “Side-Impact Protection” Really Mean?, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Apr. 28, 2010, 5:00 AM) (describing SIP as an “increasingly popular”
feature on infant car seats), available at http://news.consumerreports.org/baby
/2010/04/side-impact-protection-tested-infant-convertible-car-seats-collisioncrashes.html.
Id.
See generally NHTSA, supra note 1, at 1–2.
Mathew L. Wald, Most Baby Car Seats Fail Basic Safety Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
4, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/04/business/world
business/04iht-BABY.4102386.html.
See infra Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Car Seat Prices
Average Price
(Standard Deviation)
Sample Size

All Car Seats
$160.1
(61.96)
116

Seats with SIP
$181.92
(60.93)
68

Seats without SIP
$129.20
(49.38)
48

The $52.72 difference in average prices between seats with and
without SIP may not accurately reflect what parents are willing to pay
for side impact protection because there may be other features that
seats with SIP tend to have.166 Regression analysis can isolate the
WTP for SIP by controlling for other variables.167 This type of
regression is called hedonic analysis because it isolates certain features
that are desirable to consumers.168 Control variables that may impact
the price of the car seat include certain features: whether the seat has a
rotating canopy, removable cushions, a detachable base, the maximum
weight of the child, the store where it was purchased, and the top ten
brands (in terms of number of car seat models available). These ten
brands can be compared with the omitted category, which comprises
brands that have less than three car seat models available at Target and
Toys “R”Us.
One would expect that seats with features like a rotating canopy
and removable cushions would increase the convenience of the seat
and command a higher price. In this hedonic regression, that should
translate to positive coefficients on those variables. Consumers should
be willing to pay for a higher maximum weight because children can
use those seats for a longer period of time. SIP, the variable of interest,
should have a positive coefficient showing that parents are willing to
pay more for seats with a higher safety level. Since parents may well
use brand as a proxy for quality, one would also expect brands to have
a large impact.169 As reputation is very important in the child car seat
market, companies invest in quality and in advertising.170
166
167

168

169

170

See infra Table 2 and additional discussion in the Technical Appendix.
See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPRICIST’S COMPANION 16–18 (2008).
ERWIN DIEWERT, HEDONIC REGRESSIONS: A CONSUMER THEORY APPROACH
321 (Robert C. Feenstra & Matthew D. Shapiro eds., Univ. of Chicago Press
2003), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9740.
See generally Merrie Brucks et al., Price and Brand Name as Indicators of
Quality Dimensions for Consumer Durables, 28 J. ACAD. OF MARKETING SCI.
359, 359 (2000).
Id.
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Results show that parents are willing to pay $26.47 more for a seat
with side impact protection, which is statistically significant with a
high degree of confidence.171 Coefficients on other variables are either
of the expected sign or statistically insignificant.172 There is strong
evidence that brands play a large role in the car seat market.
Table 2: Regression Results
Variable
Side Impact Protection (SIP)

Price Coefficient
26.465***
(8.484)
Base (stay in car)
-3.325
(14.800)
Removable Cushions
-2.428
(5.777)
Rotating Canopy
8.294
(9.863)
Max. weight of infant
4.888***
(0.350)
BRANDS: Graco
-27.016***
(6.764)
Safety1st
-36.685***
(9.773)
Peg Perego
82.023***
(12.551)
Combi
8.648
(12.263)
Babytrend
-44.288***
(10.479)
Chicco
24.654***
(7.270)
Maxi Cosi
40.508***
(11.819)
Evenflo
-62.175***
(12.426)
STORE: Toys“R”Us
1.325
(6.571)
Constant
-2.246
(21.767)
Observations
116
R-squared
0.88
Ordinary least squares regression; robust standard errors
in parentheses.
* significant at 10%
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 1%

171

172

This estimate is significant at the 1% level, meaning that one can say with over
99% confidence that the coefficient on this variable is different from zero. A
high level of confidence comes from a relatively large coefficient and small
standard error. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 167, at 18 (describing
statistical significance in regression analysis).
See infra Table 2 and additional discussion in the Technical Appendix.
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2. Risk Measure for Side Impact Collisions
In 2009, the most recent year for which data is available, 430
children under age five were killed in automobile collisions.173
Assuming that injury rates are constant across the age distribution,
about eighty-six children under age one are killed annually in vehicle
crashes. Side impact collisions account for one-third of child vehicle
fatalities.174 This means that about twenty-nine children under one are
killed in side impact collisions each year.175
To calculate a fatality rate, the number of deaths must be divided
by the population that is at risk. There were 4.1 million children born
in the United States in 2009, so these infants would be under one year
old during the relevant time period.176 Since 92% of American
households have at least one automobile, approximately 3.8 million
infants are riding in automobiles.177 This implies a fatality rate from
side impact collisions of eight per million for infants.178
If side impact protection would save all of the children in these
crashes, the $26.47 willingness to pay for SIP would imply a value of
statistical life for children of $3.5 million.179 However, SIP is not
likely to save all of the children involved in side impact collisions. A
NHTSA study found that the cause of serious injury for children in
side impact collisions was usually an intruding door surface, where
“increased padding . . . within the [child restraint system] might have

173

174

175
176

177

178
179

NHTSA, FATALITY ANALYSIS REPORTING SYSTEM ENCYCLOPEDIA (2011),
available at http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/peopleallvictims.aspx. This
statistic is the sort of thing that could prompt a parent to spend extra money on a
car seat with side impact protection.
Beata Mostafavi, Child Car Seat Designed for Side Impact Crashes, THE FLINT
JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2009), available at http://articles.southbendtribune.com
/2009-12-20/news/26746752_1_car-seat-side-impact-booster-seats.htm.
See infra Technical Appendix for additional risk data.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 60 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 2
(2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_01.pdf.
See DEP’T OF TRANS., HOUSEHOLD, INDIVIDUAL, AND VEHICLE
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2011), available at http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita
.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/highlights_of_the_2001_national_household
_travel_survey/pdf/entire.pdf.
29 Fatalities divided by 3.8 million infants = 0.0000076.
$26.47 / 0.0000076 = $3,482,301. See infra Technical Appendix for additional
information.

292

UMass Law Review

v. 8 | 264

mitigated the severity of the injury sustained.”180 The International
Standards Office (“ISO”) performed a study on side impact collisions
to recommend testing procedures.181 The ISO study found that door
intrusion in the rear seats averages 170mm to 280mm in depth with a
velocity of seven meters per second to thirteen meters per second.182
With this range of depth and velocity of door intrusion, car seats that
meet side impact specifications set by the European Union protect
children in approximately one quarter of these crashes.183 If SIP can
protect one quarter of the twenty-nine children who are in potentially
fatal side impact collisions, this implies a value of statistical life for
children of $13.9 million.184
While a VSL of almost $14 million is within the range of VSL
estimates, it is at the high end of this range. A high estimate could be
due to several factors. Since most VSL estimates are based on WTP
for adult safety, I argue that the higher estimate for a child VSL
reflects a WTP a premium for child safety. However, it could also be
that the high VSL estimate is a product of idiosyncratic features of the
infant car seat market, or the relatively small sample used.
B. Existing Evidence
1. Organic Baby Food
Parents make many other market decisions that impact the safety
of their children.185 Many parents choose to buy organic baby food for
their children because they believe it is healthier and less risky.186
Organic food presumably does not contain artificial pesticide residues
that may be present in small quantities in food made from
180

181

182
183
184
185

186

LINDA MCCRAY, ET AL., NHTSA, INJURIES TO CHILDREN ONE TO THREE YEARS
OLD IN SIDE IMPACT CRASHES 14 (2010), available at http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv20/07-0186-W.pdf.
See HEIKO JOHANNSEN, ET AL., REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISO SIDE
IMPACT TEST PROCEDURE FOR CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS 3 (2007), available
at www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv20/07-0241-W.pdf.
Id. at 4–5.
Id.; see also infra Technical Appendix for additional information.
See infra Technical Appendix for additional information.
For example, parents choose not only car seats, but also cars partially based on
the safety implications for their children. Purchases of strollers, toys, and infant
formula also have implications for child safety.
Kelly B. Maguire, et al., Focus on Babies: A Note on Parental Attitudes and
Preferences for Organic Babyfood, 24 J. AGRIBUSINESS 187 (2006).
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conventionally grown crops.187 EPA economists Maguire, Owens, and
Simon use a hedonic model similar to that above to calculate that
parents are willing to pay an additional $.03 to $.04 per ounce for
organic baby food.188 The authors perform a series of focus groups to
measure perceived riskiness of conventional baby food compared to
organic baby food.189 They find that parents believe conventional food
results in a risk of cancer that is between one per million and eight per
million higher than the risk from organic baby food.190 This subjective
risk belief closely aligns with the actual risk of two per million as
measured by USDA and FDA data on child fatalities.191 Using the
willingness to pay and risk measures for organic baby food results in a
child VSL of $9 million.192
2. Asthma Medicine
Parents who have children with asthma decide what medicines to
buy to prevent a potentially fatal asthma attack.193 Professors
Blomquist, Dickie, and O’Conor use information from a statedpreference survey to determine how much parents are willing to pay
for a hypothetical asthma medicine that could improve safety for
people of various ages.194 The estimated VSL from this data is $14.1
million for children and $8.0 million for adults.195
3. Bicycle Helmets
Not all evidence points to a higher VSL for children than adults.196
Professors Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins use data from a statedpreference study to determine the annualized cost of owning and using
187
188

189
190
191
192

193
194
195
196

Id.
Kelly B. Maguire, et al., The Price Premium for Organic Babyfood: A Hedonic
Analysis, 29 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 132, 147 (2004).
Maguire, et al, supra note 186 at 192.
Id.
Id.
Maguire et al., supra note 188. $.03–$.04 per ounce is multiplied by the average
annual consumption of organic baby food in the sample to arrive at $18 x
2/million = $9 million.
Blomquist et al., supra note 117, at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 412, 421.
Jenkins et al., supra note 117, at 406–407.
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a bicycle helmet.197 When combined with data from the Centers for
Disease Control on bicycle-related fatalities, this number can be used
to estimate a child VSL of $2.7 million and adult VSL of $4 million.198
Although this estimate does not support a child premium, the study
was based on stated-preference as opposed to market data and relied
heavily on assumptions about the opportunity cost of time used to
buckle the bicycle helmets.199 The market data on child car seats and
organic baby food is more reliable and is supported by the other statedpreference data on asthma medicine.200
Although not all evidence points in the same direction, there is
strong empirical support for a child VSL in the range of $9 million to
$14 million. The lower and upper points of this range come from
estimates derived from revealed-preferences in the market, which is
the Handbook’s preferred methodology.201 Evidence from statedpreference surveys is more ambiguous.
V. SOLUTION: IMPLEMENTING A CHILD PREMIUM
The above theoretical arguments and empirical evidence point
toward a social desire to put a premium on the lives of children. As
mentioned in Section II, most estimates of a value of statistical life for
adults are around $7 million.202 These estimates are based on revealed
preferences in the labor, car, and housing markets.203 The hedonic
regression methodology used here is very similar to that used in the car
and housing markets.204 The estimates of child VSL are roughly one

197
198
199

200

201
202
203
204

Id. at 401.
Id. at 404.
See generally id. at 402 (describing the costs of bicycle helmets as a
combination of the purchase price and the opportunity cost of the time spent
buckling the helmet, which is estimated to equal two-thirds of the respondent’s
wage rate).
See NOAA, supra note 105, at 6–10 (pointing out weaknesses of statedpreference methodology).
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 4-5 to 4-6.
Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 113, at 26.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31.
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and a half to two times that of adults, so agencies should measure
benefits of child safety in a way that reflects this premium.205
Agencies can do this by using a multiplier on the VSL for children
who are predicted to be saved by a regulation. The range of child VSL
and adult VSL differ by a factor of one and a half to two, so this range,
or any point in it, could be supported by an agency engaged in
regulation of activities or products that impact child safety.206 This will
increase the estimated benefits of proposed regulations by adjusting
benefit measures to more accurately reflect the social desire to save
children, as expressed in E.O. 13,405 and the EPA’s Handbook.207 By
better reflecting society’s preferences for child safety, agencies will be
better fulfilling their obligation under Executive Order 13,563 to
“quantify . . . benefits [of health and safety] as accurately as
possible.”208
If an agency decides to use a child premium when conducting a
cost-benefit analysis, they must decide who qualifies as a “child” for
purposes of the child premium. The revealed-preference estimates
above both deal with infants. Should teenagers be treated in the same
way? Agencies have discretion to use their expertise when making this
sort of decision.209 In many situations, it seems appropriate to include
more than infants in the category that qualifies for a child premium. A
default rule might be that people under the age of majority, which is
usually eighteen, are the appropriate population to qualify for the child
premium. This rule has the benefit of clarity. An alternative approach
could be to use common law concepts to determine who should be
considered a child. For example, for the tort of negligence, children
under five years old are usually not expected to exercise care.210
205

206

207
208
209

210

The low end of the child VSL range leads to a child premium factor of $9
million / $7 million adult VSL =1.29. The upper end of the child VSL range
leads to a factor of $14 million / $7 million = 2. This range is rounded and
shortened to one and a half to two for ease of implementation.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (“OMB”), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, at 31 (2003).
Exec. Order No. 13,045, sec. 1-101(b), 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 21, 1997).
Exec. Order No. 13,563, sec. 1(c), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
See Entergy Corp v. Riverkeeper, Inc. 556 U.S. 208, 212 (2009) (holding that
agency deserved deference for reasonable assumptions made about the
economic analysis of proposed regulations).
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 15 (2d ed.
2002).
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Children above five years are held to a “reasonable child” standard.211
There is no individual conduct to hold to a reasonable standard in a
regulatory setting, but an agency could determine whether children
above a certain age could be expected to exercise care, such as engage
in a defensive activity like letting tap water run before drawing
water.212 A rule like this may better reflect who society feels needs
extra protection from danger, but would make implementation more
difficult for agencies and add uncertainty to the regulatory
environment.
If NHTSA were to use a multiplier of two when considering what
to require for side impact protection in car seats, that would double the
benefits of the proposed regulation.213 This would make it more likely
for the agency to choose a higher level of safety, and for the proposed
rule to pass a cost-benefit analysis and be approved by the Office of
Management and Budget. This can help correct market failures in the
car seat market and prevent infant deaths. Likewise, the EPA can use a
child benefit multiplier when deciding on regulations that impact child
safety, like the appropriate national standard for low-level ozone.
A. Alternative Approaches
Another way to place a benefit on the lives of children is to use a
value of statistical life-year (VSLY) instead of a VSL.214 A VSLY
takes evidence of willingness to pay for safety and translates it to a
measure of value for an additional year of life.215 This implicitly leads
to a premium on saving the lives of children, who have high life
expectancies.216 The theoretical arguments in Section III directly
support a VSLY approach in that benefits can be directly tied to the
211
212

213

214
215
216

Id. at 106.
Letting tap water run before drawing tap water drastically reduces the
concentration of lead compounds, which usually enters water from old
plumbing. See HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 2-2 (describing efforts that can
mitigate damages caused by lead in tap water).
Since all of the benefits from this regulation come from improvements in child
safety, the multiplier on child safety acts to increase the benefit estimate by one
and a half to two depending on what multiplier the agency chooses. For
regulations that have a mix of benefits to adults and children, only the benefits
that accrue to children are increased with the multiplier.
Sunstein, supra note 138, at 205.
See id. at 231.
Id. at 208.
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high life expectancy and expected improved standards of living for
children. However, empirical evidence does not seem to support a
VSLY approach, which assumes that the benefit of saving a life will
decrease in an almost linear fashion.217 Although the high child VSL
values in Section IV combined with the inverted-U shape found by
Professors Viscusi and Aldy would suggest a decreasing function, a
linear approximation does not seem the best fit.218
B. Controversial Extension: Senior Discount
Although the VSLY approach captures much of the rationale
behind a child premium, it comes with a controversial impact on the
other end of age spectrum – senior citizens.219 A VSLY approach
means that the lives of senior citizens are valued at a fraction of the
life of a middle-aged person, and a small fraction of the life of a
child.220 Again, the theoretical arguments in support of a child benefit
seem to support a discount for senior citizens.221 However, as
mentioned above, empirical estimates of VSL show a slow downward
trend after their peak at age forty-five, but do not resemble a steep
linear decline that is implied with a VSLY approach.222 If senior
citizens seem to be willing to pay a significant amount for their own
safety, then it seems unreasonable for agencies to discount the benefits
of that safety.
Since there appears to be a mismatch in theory and empirical
evidence, this is an area ripe for further research. This is especially
true considering that some other countries do discount benefits of
saving the lives of senior citizens; some agencies in the United
Kingdom have used a multiplier of .59 and European Union agencies
have used a .7 discount factor on the lives of senior citizens in benefit
calculations.223

217
218
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221
222
223

Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 115, at 579.
Id. at 580.
Sunstein, supra note 138, at 208–09.
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 214.
Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 115, at 574.
See generally Aldy &Viscusi, supra note 113.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
There is theoretical and empirical support for putting a premium on
the lives of children when agencies measure benefits for regulations
that improve safety. Children have a long life expectancy with an
increasing standard of living. They have not made choices to put
themselves in risky situations, so they are generally considered
innocent in life-threatening situations. Empirical evidence from the car
seat market shows that parents are willing to pay a premium for the
safety of their children. This high willingness to pay is consistent with
other estimates of a child VSL in the range of $9 million to $14
million. Current estimates of adult VSL center around $7 million,
indicating that a premium of one and a half to two should be put on the
lives of children who are expected to be saved by regulations.
The President can mandate the use of a child premium by issuing
an executive order to update Executive Order 13,045. An executive
order would have the benefit of creating predictable, uniform
economic analysis regarding child safety in all executive federal
agencies. However, the President would likely face political pressure
from the opposing party, interest groups, and perhaps agencies
themselves if he were to require the use of a child premium. Agencies
should not wait until they are ordered to use a child premium, but
should instead choose to use a child premium as the best way to reflect
the preferences of society and to follow the law as expressed in E.O.
12,866. This note shows agencies that the choice of how to measure
benefits of child safety is within their realm of discretion and that there
is sufficient evidence to back up a child-specific measure of one and a
half to two times that of adult VSL estimates.
A child premium will help protect children through safety
regulations promulgated by agencies like the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and
the Environmental Protection Agency. It is normatively desirable to
encourage this type of regulation because people consistently display a
desire to increase safety for children, but many products and activities
that impact child safety are either not traded on markets or are sold in
markets that exhibit failures. Without well-functioning markets,
parents and other altruistic adults are often unable to get the level of
child safety that they desire. Regulation can help correct these market
failures and ensure that our children will enjoy long and rich lives. If
agencies adopt a child premium, there will be more rules to protect
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against tragedies like Anton’s death and the mass shooting at Sandy
Hook Elementary.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Willingness to Pay Measure
The hedonic analysis in Section IV largely follows the standard
VSL estimation techniques in the economics literature.224 The
estimated VSL from a regression like this is actually a lower bound on
the WTP for a safety feature, as some of the purchasers may have been
willing to pay significantly more for SIP.225
To determine whether a car seat included SIP, information was
gathered from the websites of the stores selling the seats as well as the
websites of the car seat manufacturers. Car seats that were advertised
as including SIP by either of the stores or the manufacturer were coded
as one. This methodology was intended to mimic the information
gathering process that parents would go through when deciding which
car seat to buy. Other features, such as rotating canopy and maximum
occupant weight, were ascertained in the same way.
One way that this note’s hedonic analysis differs from the standard
methodology in the literature is that the data points on car seats were
gathered from website sales offers, not from actual sales data. Sales
data are preferred because they reflect actual equilibrium points where
buyers and sellers have agreed to an exchange.226 A website may offer
items for sale that no one is purchasing, which could lead to
overestimation of WTP for a safety feature like SIP. For proper
inference, one must assume that at least some consumers are
purchasing each of the car seats offered on the websites of Target and
Toys ‘R Us. To check this assumption, the hedonic regression was run
with the observations restricted to the top half of the sample when
sorted by “best sellers” on the websites. Results were very similar,
although the statistical significance of the coefficient on SIP dropped
to a lower confidence level of 10%.227
224
225
226

227

See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 113, at 2–4 (surveying VSL literature).
Jenkins et al., supra note 117, at 340.
Sales data has the additional benefit of adding many observations which weighs
the results based on popularity and gives the regressions much more statistical
power. See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 167, at 70 (discussing statistical
power in regression analysis).
Id. (By cutting the number of observations in half from 116 to 58, it is not
surprising that the significance level drops from 1% to 10%. Results available
upon request).
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Willingness to pay estimate for side impact protection: $26.47.
Risk Measure
A 2009 NHTSA study shows that most child fatalities in side
impact collisions result from head injuries, mostly due to door
intrusion.228 A report commissioned by the ISO finds that door
intrusion in rear seats averages 170mm to 280mm in depth with a
velocity of seven meters per second to thirteen meters per second.229
According to the ISO report, this would protect children in twentyseven percent of side impact collisions.230 With a statistical error of
plus or minus three percent, one-quarter is within this estimate, and is
used in this paper.231 Use of twenty-seven percent instead of onequarter results in a child VSL estimate that is within the suggested
range.
Baseline risk measure: 29 fatalities / 3.8 million infant riders =
.000007632.
Risk measure with SIP: (29 fatalities – 1/4 * 29 saved by SIP) / 3.8
million = .000005724.

VSL Calculation
To calculate the VSL, the WTP estimate is divided by the change
in risk due to SIP.
Model: WTP / (Baseline risk - risk with SIP) = VSL
VSL: $26.47 / (.000007632 - .000005724) = $13,873,165

228
229
230
231

NHTSA, supra note 188, at 4.
JOHANNSSEN ET AL., supra note 181, at 5.
Id.
Id.

